The next “hold your breath” moment will come when the first US missiles strike Chinese targets. The prospect of a nuclear state using a conventional ballistic missile against another nuclear state, especially one with a presumptive nuclear advantage, is laden with complexity. This is true not simply because these missiles are difficult to intercept, but also because such missiles could carry nuclear warheads. The most dangerous form of attack would involve a ballistic missile volley against a carrier. An attack launched from a ship or a submarine makes any PLAN military vessel fair game for the United States, but doesn’t necessarily incur US attacks against PLAAF airbases, Second Artillery missile installations, or even naval installations. The loss of a major warship and its crew might serve to solidify US commitment (at least in the short term) rather than undermine it. However, both US and Chinese strategists may overestimate US casualty aversion. The sinking of a warship would likely also result in the greatest loss of life of any single action for the US military in action since the Vietnam War. The United States hasn’t lost a fighter in action since the 1999 Kosovo War, and hasn’t lost a major warship since World War II. Similarly, the survival of the US-led alliance system requires that the United States successfully defeat Chinese aggression if it cannot, the alliance system could deteriorate and collapse. The PLA will attempt to inflict sufficient casualties on US forces that future US decision-makers will hesitate to use force against the PRC. The third and fourth tasks rest upon the second. The second involves the use of submarines, aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles to destroy US and allied installations and warships across East Asia. The first task requires the deployment of PLAN surface forces, possibly in combination with PLAAF airborne forces, to seize an objective. The latter would waste resources, run the risk of escalation, and have unpredictable effects on the Chinese political system. US military planners would be well-advised to concentrate the strategic campaign on the first two objectives and hope that success has a political effect, rather than roll the dice on a broader “strategic” campaign against CCP political targets.
The defeat of Chinese expeditionary forces, and the destruction of a large percentage of the PLAN and the PLAAF, may cause domestic turmoil in the medium to long term. The third task probably depends on the successful execution of the first two. We can expect, for example, that the USN and USAF will target Chinese airbases, naval bases, and potentially missile bases in an effort to maximize damage to the PLAN and PLAAF. The second task will require a wide range of attacks against deployed Chinese air and naval units, as well as ships and aircraft held in reserve. Except in the case of a war that breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, the first task involves either defeating a Chinese attempt to land forces, or preventing the reinforcement and resupply of those troops before forcing their surrender.
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